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Illinois Appellate Court Puts Scare Into
Corporations By Striking Down
Arbitration Agreement
The Illinois 5 th District Appellate Court set a high bar for ma-
jor businesses and bestowed increased protection on Illinois consum-
ers this summer when it ruled that a satellite broadcasting company
could not enforce the mandatory arbitration provision of its standard
customer service agreement because the agreement was procedurally
unconscionable.4 8
DirecTV is a national satellite television provider that works
through hundreds of independent retailers around the country to sign
up customers for its satellite service.49 A potential customer usually
first purchases the necessary television equipment from the indepen-
dent retailer; then the customer calls DirecTV personally to sign up
for one of the company's satellite packages.5 DirecTV typically
then waits until after service is activated to mail the customer for the
first time a copy of the parties' proposed written contract, called the
"Customer Agreement." The com pany typically sends the contract in
the same envelope as the first bill. 1
In November 1999, Charlotte Bess purchased the necessary
equipment and signed up for a DirecTV service plan. Thereafter, she
received a copy of DirecTV's October 1999 Customer Service
Agreement, which specified that if the customer does not accept the
terms of the agreement, she must notify DirecTV immediately to
cancel her service. If she does not do this and continues to receive
the service, the Customer Agreement states she accepts the terms of
52the contract. Among it terms, the contract stated that the customer
incurs a "deactivation fee" if and when she cancels her service. The
contract did not contain a provision, however, concerning any refund
48 Bess v. DirecTV, Inc., 2007 WL 2013613 (Il1. App. 5 Dist. 2007).
49 Id. at * 1.
50 id.
51 id.
52 Id. at *1.
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for the already purchased television equipment.53 Also, the contract
stated that Bess would receive a bill from DirecTV once every 30
days, and if DirecTV did not receive payment in full before issuing
its next statement, it would charge Bess a $5 administrative late fee.
Bess eventually sued DirecTV over this provision, arguing
that the $5 administrative late fee was improper because the compa-
ny's true cost for the inconvenience of a late-paying customer
amounted to far less than $5.55 Bess argued that the fee violates both
Illinois common law regarding liquidated damages and the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.
56
However, Bess' contract with DirecTV also contained an ar-
bitration agreement, whereby Bess waived her right to a jury trial.57
The contract first included an informal dispute resolution clause, un-
der which Bess must first notify DirecTV of her claim at least 60
days before starting any formal proceeding. 58 The contract also in-
cluded a formal dispute resolution clause, under which both parties
agreed that any legal claim "will be resolved only by binding arbitra-
tion. The contract stated that Bess would pay a fee of $125 if she
initiated the arbitration and would pay certain other fees related to the
arbitration. 60 The contract declared in bold print: "ARBITRATION
MEANS YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL. 61
DirecTV notified Bess in December 2000 that it intended to
enforce the contract's provisions and then filed a motion in court to
compel arbitration and stay Bess' action so the arbitration could
move forward. 62 However, the trial court declined DirecTV's mo-
tion, finding that the arbitration clause was both procedurally and
3 Bess, 2007 WL 2013613 at *1.
14 Id. at * 1.
55 Id. *2.
56 See 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq.
17 Bess, 2007 WL 2013613 at *1.
58 Id.
59 id.
60 id.
61 id.
62 Bess, 2007 WL 2013613 at *2.
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substantively unconscionable. 63 A three-justice panel of the Appel-
late Court of Illinois for the 5th District affirmed the trial court in a 2-
1 decision.
The court first affirmed the fundamental importance of en-
forcing valid arbitration agreements, but asserted that a party can be
forced into arbitration "only if he or she has in fact entered into a va-
lid, enforceable contract waiving his or her right to a judicial fo-
rum.'64 The court here was most concerned with whether the Cus-
tomer Agreement was procedurally unconscionable, i.e. whether it
was "so difficult to find, read, or understand that the plaintiff cannot
fairly be said to have been aware he was agreeing to it" and whether
there is "disparity of bargaining power between the drafter.., and
the party claiming unconscionability." 65 The court said it must ana-
lyze procedural unconscionability by looking at the totality of the cir-
cumstances.
66
The court noted that the DirecTV arbitration provision was
printed on a 10-paneled, fold-up pamphlet in about an eight-point
font, with each panel containing more than 700 words. 67 The court
also noted the disparate bargaining position between DirecTV and
Bess and that DirecTV issued the provision to Bess on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis.68 However, the court said all these facts were relevant,
but more was required for a finding of procedural unconscionabili-
ty-there must be "some impropriety during the process of forming
the contract depriving a party of a meaningful choice."
69
The court found such impropriety in the fact that Bess never
saw the contract before she signed up for the DirecTV satellite ser-
vice, and that if she cancelled the contract she would be charged a
"deactivation fee" and be on the hook for her already-purchased sa-
tellite equipment. 70 The court applied an Illinois Supreme Court de-
63 Id.
64 Id. at *3.
65 Id. at *5.
66 Id. at *4.
67 Bess, 2007 WL 2013613 at *5.
68 id.
69 Id. at *6.
70 Id. at *7.
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cision, Razor v. Hyundai Motor America 71, to the case. In Razor, the
Supreme Court held that a consequential damages provision in a pre-
printed limited warranty form was unenforceable because it was not
conveyed to the consumer at or before the time of the purchase.72
The appellate court extended this line of reasoning to preprinted cus-
tomer agreements like the one Bess entered into with DirecTV. Cit-
ing Razor, the court said "it simply does not matter how large the
type was or how clearly.., expressed if the consumer did not have
the opportunity to see the language before entering into the con-
tract." The court said that Bess never saw the arbitration clause be-
fore entering into her contract, and there was no way for her to have
seen the provision until she received her first bill. 7  Moreover, the
court said that by making Bess buy her equipment first, DirecTV "re-
quired Bess to contract to receive its service and substantially change
her economic position before she was provided with
the. .. [algreement... [t]herefore, Bess was deprived of a meaningful
choice. "
The appellate court found that the procedural unconscionabili-
ty of Bess' contract rose to such a level that it invalidated the arbitra-
tion provision, thereby allowing Bess to proceed with her action in
court. 7 6 The appellate court declined to determine whether the con-
tract also was substantively unconscionable because it was unneces-
77
sary to the outcome of the case.
However, one justice on the court forcefully dissented. Jus-
tice James K. Donovan agreed that Bess' customer agreement was
"unconscionable to a certain extent," but argued that this by itself
could not render the entire arbitration provision unenforceable.
Justice Donovan cited an Illinois Supreme Court case, Kinkel
v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, that reviewed a cell phone service agree-
ment similar to the DirecTV contract, and found that even though the
71 Razor v. Hyundai Motor America, 222 Il1.2d 75 (2006).
72 Id. at 102-03.
" Bess, 2007 WL 2013613 at *6.
74 Id.
71 Id. at *7.
76 Id.
17 Id. at *8.
78 Bess, 2007 WL 2013613 at *8 (Donovan, J., dissenting).
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contract did not inform the consumer of the costs of the arbitration
process or that she would be required to pay some of the costs, this
procedural unconscionability did not by itself render a class action
waiver in the agreement unenforceable. 79 The court in that case said
that such form contracts:
are a fact of modem life. Consumers routinely sign such
agreements to obtain credit cards, rental cars, land and cel-
lular telephone service, home furnishings and appliances,
loans, and other products and services. It cannot reasona-
bly be said that all such contracts are so procedurally un-
conscionable as to be unenforceable.
8 0
Justice Donovan said Kinkel should hold sway and reasoned
that the Razor case was distinguishable, because a limited warranty
like the one in Razor is entirely different from the standard customer
service agreement at issue in the case at bar.8' He argued the strong
public policy favoring arbitration agreements, unlike limited warran-
ties. He also emphasized how customary such customer contracts are
these days, and how typical it is to send the agreement after purchase
is made or inside the product box, where the customer accepts or re-
jects to contract after purchase.8 2
Further, Justice Donovan cited case law from the 7th Circuit
which argued that consumers as a whole are better off "when vendors
skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation, and use
instead a simple approve-or-retum device. Competent adults are
bound by such agreements, read or unread.,
8 3
Justice Donovan found that the deactivation fee in Bess' con-
tract was somewhat procedurally unconscionable, but that such pro-
visions are increasingly commonplace.84 Also, he found no direct
evidence that Bess would not get a refund for her purchased equip-
79 Id. at *8 (citing Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 223 Il.2d 1, 27 (2006)).
80 Kinkel, 223 Il1.2d at 26.
" Bess, 2007 WL 2013613 at *8.
82 Id. at *9.
83 Id. at *8 (citing Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir.
1997).
84 Bess, 2007 WL 2013613 at *9.
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ment.85 Thus, he concluded that the arbitration agreement still should
have been enforceable.
86
The Illinois decision comes at a time when mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements and the familiar small-type, pre-printed customer
contracts typical of countless everyday consumer transactions are
coming under increasing scrutiny in courts across the nation. In Sep-
tember 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1 1 th Circuit found a
class action waiver unconscionable as written in the arbitration
agreement of a customer contract issued by cable giant Comcast
Corp.87 The Washington Supreme Court reached a similar decision
recently, ruling that cell phone provider Cingular Wireless could not
enforce its arbitration agreement forcing consumers to waive their
rights to a class action. 88
The decision in Bess should reverberate through corporate
America because it attacks the arbitration agreements generally and
strikes down as unconscionable procedures that have become stan-
dard across the country. The Illinois Supreme Court has yet to ad-
dress the issue.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Gene Dale v. Comcast Corp., 2007 WL 2471222 (11 th Cir. 2007).
88 Phuong Cat Le, State High Court Says Consumers Can 't Sign Away Class
Action Rights, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 13, 2007, at Al.
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